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Constitution Drafting as Cold War Realpolitik:  




The present chapter explores the appointment, work, and legacy of the noted British 
constitutionalist Sir Ivor Jennings (1903-1965) as constitutional advisor to the Nepal 
Government in the late 1950s. Jennings visited Kathmandu for one month from 28 March to 
24 April 1958. He was employed by the British Foreign Office (FO) upon the request of the 
Nepali monarch, King Mahendra Bikram Shah, to advise the small Commission charged with 
the drafting of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal 1959 – the third constitutional 
document in the country’s history. In 1941, Jennings had moved to Sri Lanka, where he 
resided until 1955. While in Sri Lanka, he became progressively involved with constitution-
making processes and constitutional politics in the decolonising world. This period of 
Jennings’ life, the body of literature pertaining to the postcolonial world that he produced, 
and his advisory work in decolonising countries is referred to here as the ‘Oriental Jennings’.1 
It is argued here that his work in/on South Asia represents the core of the academic 
production and advisory work of the ‘Oriental Jennings’.2 Aside from Britain – Sri Lanka, 
India, and Pakistan were the countries Jennings was most familiar with and to whom he 
dedicated the majority of his academic writings. 3  This essay maintains that Jennings’ 
constitutional advisory work in Nepal is crucial to understanding the progression of his 
thinking on constitutional democracy in both Asia and Britain. 
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In this regard, my analysis of Jennings’ work in Nepal purports to trace the ‘evolutionary 
view’ of postcolonial constitutional problems and solutions formed by Jennings through his 
direct South Asian experiences in Sri Lanka (1941-55), the Maldives (1952-1953), and 
Pakistan (1954-55), and his long-term indirect engagement with India. The essay aims to 
reflect upon the manner in which the various constitutional mechanisms that Jennings 
developed in South Asia – all instances of a modified Westminster model – have been 
deployed in Nepal, the last of Jennings’ South Asian endeavours. The analysis is based on my 
reading and interpretation of the archival sources pertaining to Jennings’ constitutional 
advisory work in Nepal – and South Asia more broadly – held at the Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies of the University of London,4 and at the British National Archives in 
Kew Gardens,5 together with Jennings’ copious published work on the region. It is important 
to highlight that this essay provides a partial – and somehow piecemeal – account of 
Jennings’ constitutional work in Kathmandu due to the almost complete absence of Nepali 
sources on his engagement and legacy in the country, aside from the few articles on the 
national state-owned daily newspaper, Gorkhapatra.  
The key questions that the essay seeks to answer is to what degree Jennings departed from 
the British constitutional model in his constitutional advisory work in Nepal – and why. The 
essay also aims to explore the extent to which Jennings’ constitutional vision was tempered 
by the agency of the people instructing him – in the case of Nepal by both King Mahendra 
and the British Government. In this respect, particular emphasis will be placed on the 
political and strategic considerations of different political actors in the Cold War context, 
which played a fundamental role in structuring the behaviour of all the key actors more or 
less directly involved in the drafting of Nepal’s 1959 Constitution.   
Nepal’s third Constitution was promulgated in February 1959, but was short lived. King 
Mahendra suspended the document in December 1960 and promulgated a new constitution in 
1962 to pave the way to the new Panchayat regime and thirty years of monarchical autocracy 
in the country. The 1959 Constitution is particularly important in Nepal’s constitutional 
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history because it was explicitly used by the drafters of the 1990 Constitution as the main 
template and model for constitution-making after Nepal’s second democratisation as revealed 
in the interviews I conducted with them in 2007.6 Indeed, Nepali constitution-makers in 1990 
sought to improve on the 1959 document, especially with regard to the institutional 
boundaries and limitations to the powers of the King.7 It also seems plausible that the 1959 
document had also inspired the 1962 Panchayat Constitution and had a lasting impact on 
Nepal’s constitutional developments, especially with regard to the piecemeal 
constitutionalisation of the Shah monarchy. In fact, Jennings had sought to introduce a 
‘modified’ Westminster model in 1950s Nepal, but the central issue the present analysis 
seeks to address is the extent to which the 1959 Constitution deviated from the British model 
and the long-term impact of such ‘modifications’ on democratic politics in Nepal. 
The chapter is divided into four parts. The first section provides a brief historical background 
to Nepal’s political circumstances at the time of Jennings’ visit to Kathmandu in the late 
1950s at a crucial stage of the Cold War. The second part analyses the process by which 
Jennings was selected as the constitutional advisor to Nepal by the British FO in agreement 
with the Nepali Government. The third section investigates the details of Jennings’ work in 
Kathmandu and his relationship with the Nepali actors he most closely engaged with. The 
final part of the essay seeks to reflect on the long-standing legacy of Jennings’ constitutional 
advisory work and its impact on democratic politics in Nepal.  
 
1. Nepal’s Historical Context 
The creation of modern Nepal as the state entity we know today was initiated in the late 19th 
century by the military conquests of King Prithvi Narayan Shah of Gorkha – a small Hindu 
principality lying westward of Kathmandu. The military campaign culminated with the 
conquest of the Kathmandu Valley in 1769 and Gorkhali territorial expansion progressed 
even after the death of Prithvi Narayan, but was eventually halted by the clash with the East 
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India Company in 1814. In 1816, the Treaty of Sagauli marked the victory of the British 
colonial power over the Gorkhalis with a significant territorial loss and a growing British 
influence over political developments in Nepal. In fact, Britain became the only country to 
have diplomatic representation in Kathmandu through the British Residency, and to benefit 
from the supply of Gurkha soldiers, although Britain was not allowed recruitment on 
Gorkhali territory until after supporting the East India Company in the 1857 insurrection.8  
Two features of Nepali political history are central to the present analysis. First, the Kingdom 
of Nepal, while entertaining close diplomatic ties with London, especially after the 
establishment of direct Crown rule over the Indian subcontinent in 1858, never became a 
British colony and preserved its independence. Second, the institution of the Shah monarchy, 
which maintained dynastic continuity until 2008 when the Constituent Assembly declared 
Nepal to be a Republic, played a critical role in the country’s processes of state formation and 
nation-building. In fact, in 1846, when a young aristocrat, Jang Bahadur Kunwar, 
successfully carried out a coup and captured state power, he retained the Shah monarch as 
Head of State and even reinforced the aura of sanctity of the King.9 The monarch, while 
placed at the centre of the political legitimacy of the Nepali state, remained devoid of any 
effective power under the newly established Rana regime – an arrangement that remained in 
place for over a century. In this respect, it has been convincingly argued that the preservation 
of the Shah monarchy under the Rana rule provided ideological continuity with previous 
regime, leaving the path fully prepared for the Shah Kings to resume effective power after the 
Rana autocracy was overthrown.10  
Between 1950 and 1951 an alliance between King Tribhuvan Shah and the newly created 
Nepali political parties succeeded in toppling the Rana regime with independent India’s 
support and sought to transition Nepal to democracy. The years between 1951 and 1959, 
when the first general elections were held, were characterised by transitional politics and 
great instability, exacerbated by tensions between the political parties and the monarchy, 
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bitter inter-party disputes and the succession of a long string of Cabinets alternated by 
periods of direct monarchical rule. In his Royal Proclamation of 18 February 1951, King 
Tribhuvan declared: ‘hereafter our subjects shall be governed in accordance with a 
democratic constitution to be framed by the Constituent Assembly elected by the people’.11 
However, the idea of a Constituent Assembly was not to be realised in Nepal until 2008 – and 
Nepal’s many constitutions were to be drafted by small unelected and unrepresentative 
Commissions for many years to come.  
On 11 April 1951, the King promulgated the Interim Government of Nepal Act 1951, the first 
constitution ever enforced in the country – a provisional document to govern Nepal until a 
definitive one was drafted. The new constitutional dispensation borrowed extensively from 
the Government of India Act 1935, which effectively functioned as India’s Interim 
Constitution between 1947 and 1950. In fact, it was under the guidance of Prof. Ram Ugra 
Singh of Lucknow University that a small Nepali Commission prepared the document.12 
Nepal’s 1951 Interim Constitution featured a modified version of the British principle of 
King-in-Council as executive powers were vested in the King and the Council of Ministers. 
However, the King enjoyed unusually wide powers, including legislative powers through the 
issuing of ordinances, as the Constitution did not establish a separate and independent 
legislative branch. Eventually, in June 1951 the Second Amendment to the Constitution 
created an Advisory Assembly General, which enjoyed only limited legislative authority 
while the King retained ‘sovereign and plenary powers to make laws’ and the discretion to 
withhold royal assent. While the new dispensation introduced forms of judicial scrutiny over 
executive actions, these were progressively eroded through amendments to the Constitution 
and ordinary legislation, together with an expansive use of royal prerogative powers.13 The 
text made no explicit reference to Hinduism and left the issue of the place of Nepal’s 
religious tradition to the permanent constitution.  
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The death of King Tribhuvan in 1955 and the coronation of his son Mahendra led to a more 
active role of the Shah monarchy in the conduct of Nepal’s turbulent political affairs. 
According to one analysis, King Mahendra ‘aspired to exercise an active leadership in 
accordance with Hindu traditions and these aspirations were manifested by his refusal to hold 
elections for a Constituent Assembly, and the desire to write the constitution himself with no 
sovereignty being vested in the people’.14 King Mahendra’s attitude is also evident in the 
amendments he made to the Interim Constitution, which instead of transferring power to the 
people further concentrated them in the hands of the monarch. As a result, the King continued 
to ignore demands for the creation of a Constituent Assembly after general elections had been 
postponed twice. Then, in early 1958, Mahendra made a resolute move and invited British 
constitutional expert Sir Ivor Jennings to guide the impending constitution-making process. 
Soon afterwards, he independently appointed a Commission to draft the new constitution. 
 
2. Selecting Jennings for the ‘Nepal Mission’ (11 May 1956 – 1 February 1958) 
This section investigates the circumstances and negotiations surrounding Jennings’ selection 
and appointment as the constitutional advisor to the Government of Nepal between 1956 and 
1958. The analysis relies on the correspondence between Jennings and FO officials held in 
Jennings’ Private Papers.15 The British FO played a key role in selecting Jennings, in shaping 
the instructions and terms of reference of his mission to Nepal, and in organising and funding 
the trip in its entirety. In this respect, two key points ought to be emphasised.  
First, the Cold War context was fundamental in determining the British Government’s 
selection of Jennings and framing his mandate. In fact, throughout the 1950s South Asia 
represented for Britain and the Western bloc a crucial Cold War battleground. While Pakistan 
had become a key anti-Soviet ally in the region through the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO), India had a more ambivalent position, especially since the formation 
of the Non-Aligned Movement of countries across Asia and Africa propelled by the 1955 
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Bandung Conference.16 The British Government’s interest in Nepal also resulted from the 
Himalayan country’s geopolitical and strategic location between two key global players, 
India and the Popular Republic of China, whose invasion of Tibet had begun in 1950 and 
culminated with the capture of Lhasa in 1959 – very close to the Nepal border. Since his 
accession to the throne, King Mahendra had pursued a programme of diversification in his 
foreign policy with the intent of involving major outside powers to counteract its immediate 
neighbours, India and China.17 This resulted in a number of countries establishing embassies 
in Kathmandu, and the strengthening of Nepal’s relationships with Britain. As a result, 
Jennings’s instructions from the FO for his Nepal mission were clear, although never spelt 
out in any of the letters exchanged between him and the Ministry. In line with India’s policy 
over Tibet, the aim was to produce a constitution capable of fostering political stability and 
consolidating Nepal’s position as a buffer zone against expanding Communist China.18  
Second, the essay seeks to highlight the agency exercised by Nepali political players in the 
selection and support to the constitution-drafting work carried out by Jennings during his visit 
to Kathmandu in 1958. As clearly illustrated by the correspondence analysed below, King 
Mahendra and his political advisors were keen to secure Jennings’ services; it is crucial to 
highlight that in no way was Jennings an imposition of the British Government on the Nepali 
Government. In fact, by 1956, Jennings was a well-known constitutional actor in South Asia 
as he had both published extensively on constitutional developments in the region and been 
an active player in constitutional politics in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Pakistan. Thus, the 
Nepali King and his advisors most likely had a sense of the kind of ‘modified Westminster 
model’ Jennings could devise for Nepal in light of his previous work in other South Asian 
jurisdictions, where he had fostered strong but ultimately unaccountable executives. 
On 11 May 1956, Jennings was first approached by the FO with a proposal from the Nepali 
Prime Minister and the Minister of Education to set up a new residential university in Nepal 
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and assist in the drafting of a new constitution.19 The elections for a Constituent Assembly, 
promised by King Tribhuvan Shah in 1951, were still on the cards a little over a year after 
King Mahendra’s accession to the throne in March 1955. In fact, in August 1955, after the 
political parties put pressure on him, King Mahendra had announced that the elections for the 
Constituent Assembly would finally take place in October 1957.20 On 13 May 1956, Jennings 
replied to the FO letter illustrating two concrete options for constitution-building in Nepal: 
‘settling a constitutional draft with the Government would take only a few months, while 
getting a draft through a Constituent Assembly would take much longer’. Jennings also 
informed the FO that he was unavailable for two years until mid-1958 and recommended Sir 
Robert Drayton QC in his stead.21 
On 3 July 1956, the FO again contacted Jennings with an invitation from the Nepali Prime 
Minister for Jennings to visit Kathmandu between August and September 1956 to advise the 
Nepali Government on the general elections, at the time still scheduled for October 1957. In 
particular, Jennings’ opinion was sought with regard as to whether the elections should be 
held for a Constituent Assembly or only for an elected Parliament.22 Significantly, in January 
1957 the King had formed a new Cabinet and appointed the Praja Parishad’s leader Tanka 
Prasad Acharya as Prime Minister, who soon after started agitating for ‘a Parliament with 
limited powers operating under a Constitution granted by the King [on the basis that] there 
could not be two sovereigns in the country at the same time, and that the people of Nepal 
were not quite prepared for a full-fledged democracy’. 23  The new position of the Praja 
Parishad alienated the party from the democratic movement in Nepal, and made it 
increasingly isolated, while political tension kept mounting in the country. As a result, the 
invitation to Jennings was followed by delays and nothing eventually came of it. In a letter 
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dated 29 January 1957, the FO stated that it was a ‘disappointing outcome’ as ‘the Nepalese 
are not quite sure about what they want’.24  
Political machinations and manoeuvring continued in Kathmandu as the monarchy 
progressively became increasingly active in the political sphere and tensions with the 
democratic political parties more acute. Significantly, on 18 February 1957 Jennings was 
visited at Trinity Hall in Cambridge by Lok Darshan, King Mahendra’s Personal Secretary, 
who was travelling to the UK as part of a one-month-long world tour to study electoral, 
parliamentary, and constitutional practice and procedure.25 A couple of months later, on 26 
April 1957, the FO contacted Jennings to inform him that his services were no longer 
required in Nepal.26 A letter of the UK Ambassador to Nepal dated June 1958 later explained 
that Jennings’ first invitation to Nepal was dropped due to Indian pressures: ‘I have no 
sympathy with the Indians on this. They have only themselves to blame if by their actions 
they compelled the Nepalese to act surreptitiously in order not to be bullied out of asking for 
Jennings’ services, as they were at an earlier stage’.27  India has historically exercised a 
dominant influence in Nepali political affairs, and did not take kindly to Britain’s efforts to 
exert sway in Kathmandu through its offer of constitutional advice. 
The new Cabinet’s failure to hold its first general elections in October 1957 was followed on 
14 November by King Mahendra’s Royal Proclamation summarily dismissing the 
government and announcing 18 February 1959 as the new date for the general elections.28 
Shortly afterwards, on 13 December 1957, the FCO again contacted Jennings encouraging 
him to accept King Mahendra’s renewed invitation to visit Nepal to strengthen the goodwill 
between the UK and Nepal and ‘straighten the confusion of ideas now disturbing the 
Nepalese political scene’.29 On 7 January 1958, the FCO followed up with Jennings further 
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detailing that the visit to Kathmandu would have been for only one month.30 On 14 January 
1958, the FCO again contacted Jennings to relay the information gathered by the UK 
Ambassador to Nepal that King Mahendra was now thinking of granting a constitution 
himself. At this point, the FCO put further pressure on Jennings to accept the instructions by 
saying that his visit would have been most valuable and that much would depend on the King 
having sound advice at such a time. Moreover, the FCO letter specified that King Mahendra 
would have issued a formal invitation to Jennings only when sure of his availability and that 
the King wished to make a public announcement about Sir Ivor’s visit to Kathmandu.31 On 
19 January 1958, Jennings eventually accepted the instructions from the FCO and his 
honorarium was agreed ten days later.32  
As a result, on 1 February 1958, King Mahendra issued a Royal Proclamation to serve as the 
roadmap for Nepal's constitution-making process where the King blamed the lack of progress 
on Nepal’s political instability.33 King Mahendra also announced the establishment of a five-
member Constitution Drafting Commission to prepare a new constitution, which was to form 
the basis for holding the elections of a bicameral parliament. The Commission was to include 
five members: the Chairman, Bhagvati Prasad Singh (Chairman of the Public Service 
Commission); three ordinary Members, Ramraj Panth (Principal of the Law College), S.P. 
Upadhayaya (Nepali Congress), Randhir Subba (Gorkha Parishad); and the Secretary, Hora 
Prasad Joshi.34 King Mahendra stated that the new constitution was to answer the needs of 
the country, time and circumstances and that the scope of the document was to protect 
primarily Nepal’s sovereignty and independence.35 The emphasis placed by the King on the 
importance of preserving Nepal’s national unity implied that the Shah monarchy was to play 
a central role in the new constitutional edifice. In fact, the focus on the monarchy operating a 
parliamentary system of government within a unitary state entirely sidelined the debates over 
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a republican form of state and federal restructuring already present in Nepal. At the same 
time, the Constituent Assembly option had been completely discarded in favour of a small 
unelected Commission, selected by the main political forces and devised to function under 
the guidance of a foreign expert, who had been equally handpicked and agreed upon by both 
the Nepali and British Governments. 
 
3. Jennings in Nepal (28 March – 24 April 1958) 
The 1 February 1958 Royal Proclamation provided the blueprint for Nepal’s efforts in 
constitution-drafting: ‘there shall be a commission to prepare a draft for a new constitution 
[…] on the basis of the present Interim Constitution, according to necessity foreign experts 
will be co-opted to aid and advise the commission; on the basis of the constitution thus 
prepared, General Elections shall be held for Parliament; this Parliament shall consist of two 
Houses and all possible provisions shall be made to safeguard the country’s sovereignty, 
independence and people’s rights’.36 Jennings’ mandate was to help create a constitution 
within the parameters of constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. 
On 28 March 1958, Sir Ivor Jennings landed in Kathmandu on his way from London via 
Delhi to assist the Nepali Government in the drafting of the new constitution as announced by 
the local daily.37 On 31 March, the first meeting with the Commission was held; as Jennings 
recorded in his diary, the discussion revolved around Parliament’s Second Chamber, which 
both Upadhyaya and Subba opposed, but feeling that the King was pledged they agreed to a 
second chamber based on the Ceylon model. Jennings reflected on the first day: 
Nothing else of any significance was said, and it was plain that I would have to submit a 
draft for discussion, as in fact I had assumed (and I had already drafted eight or ten articles, 
which had to be revised after the discussion). There were no papers before the meeting 
except the Constitution of 1948 and the Interim Constitution. I asked for copies of the 
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Citizenship Act and the Representation of the People Bill, and they were promised for 1 
April.38  
On 2 April, a short meeting of the Commission took place to inform Jennings that there was 
no Regency Act, which he had anticipated, and a superficial discussion was held on Jennings’ 
rough draft, which he completed on 3 April; it was later typed and returned to Jennings for 
corrections on 7 April.  
In the afternoon of 7 April, Jennings had an audience with King Mahendra, who had however 
not yet received a copy of the draft:  
He gave me a lead, and I gave him a lecture, with apologies, about the constitutional 
problems of Nepal. Occasionally he made encouraging noises, but he said nothing, and at 
the end of the lecture he indicated, by asking me about Sital Nivas, that the audience was at 
an end.39  
Later that day Jennings met with the Chairman of the Election Commission to receive the 
Report of the Delimitation Commission; he also made an appointment with the Secretary of 
the Law Ministry and obtained the Citizenship Act, the Citizenship Bill (of which he was not 
aware), the Civil Liberties Act (which he termed ‘a piece of eyewash’), the Interpretation Act, 
and a set of rules on Government Procedure (clearly borrowed from India). The 
Representation of the People Bill, instead, was only received on 11 April.  
On 10 April, Jennings met with the Commission’s Secretary, Hora Prasad Joshi, and 
discussed the parallel draft prepared by him, which had been circulated amongst the 
Commission’s Members. In his Confidential Notes to the FCO, Jennings commented on 
Joshi’s draft as follows:  
It was, technically, a pathetic document, and the claim of Hora Prasad Joshi, the Secretary of 
the Commission, that it was all of his own work, seemed superficially to be justified. It was 
a collection of bits from other constitutions strung together amateurishly. On the other hand, 
Randhir Subba, another Member, said that it came from the Palace, but not from the King. 
This is probably a guess, founded on the suspicion which the Gorkha Parishad has of His 
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Majesty. My own guess is that Joshi is an ambitious young man who took this opportunity 
to bring his merits to His Majesty’s attention (copies of both were supplied to His Majesty). 
However, the draft was never circulated in the Commission.40 
On 11 April, Jennings met with the Commission for the third time to discuss his first draft; 
the main point of contention regarded the extensive powers granted to the King.  
The lead was taken by Subba [Gorkha Parishad], who obviously had some major criticisms 
of the powers suggested for the King, but did not put them with the force I had expected. 
Afterwards I gave a general exposition of the draft, pointing out the controversial positions 
(mostly those relating to the powers of the King), and asking for decisions.41  
In the morning of 12 April, Jennings met privately with Subba, who explained to him that the 
Members could not speak frankly in the Commission for fear of leakages:  
Evidently both he and Upadhyaya [Nepali Congress] are in favour of cutting the powers of 
the King to a minimum, but dare not say so. […] Never once did he mention the public 
interest nor – unlike most of those who have spoken to me – did he say anything against 
India. He did mention the danger from the North.42  
Subba talked about the financial circumstances of the Nepali political parties and said that the 
Communist Party was entirely dependent on funds from Russia and China – and that it was 
unlikely that such funds would be received as China was more focused on India and on 
pacifying Tibet. The Nepali Congress and the Gorkha Parishad, instead, allegedly had 
approximately one million rupees each as they were funded by Class C Ranas and Class A 
Ranas respectively.  
On 13 April, Jennings met with the Commission for the fourth time. He put forward a 
number of arrangements to strengthen the constitutional position of the King. The first 
proposal was to ‘put teeth’ into Parliament’s Upper House, the Senate (Maha Sabha), by 
giving a majority of nominated members and having them nominated at the King’s 
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discretion; but the Commission opted for the innocuous Ceylon Senate. The Upper House 
was composed of 36 members, 18 elected by the Lower House and 18 nominated by the 
King, making it easy for parliamentary proceedings to reach an impasse in a bicameral 
system. The second proposal was to devise a Council of State (Rajya Parishad, a consultative 
body for the King to receive advice) on the model of the old British Privy Council.  
I said that the powers of the King were very heavy, and they might have to be borne by a not 
very experienced King or by a Queen regnant. He (or she) would have to consult somebody, 
and if no formal consultative body was constituted he would necessarily consult members of 
his Household. I mentioned that after the death of the Prince Consort Queen Victoria had 
been accused of consulting “irresponsible advisers”, and that it was far better that the King 
should consult a body, which included the Prime Minister and the other Ministers. This 
argument was accepted together with an idea suggested by Panth that the Speaker and 
Deputy Speaker and the President and the Deputy President of the Senate should also be 
members. This of course would do no harm whatever, because the King can add as many as 
his own nominees as he wishes.43  
Jennings saw the Council of State as a buffer for the King against popular discontent.44 
Moreover, Jennings explained further on the issue of the King’s extensive powers:  
On the question of the King’s discretionary power to refuse Royal Assent, I carried the draft 
by pointing out that it would be difficult [for the King] to refuse unless he had the Council 
of State with him. Kings, like politicians, have to keep their popularity.45 
On other aspects of the King’s powers, Jennings felt he had to compromise a little, but not as 
much as he had expected. The question of the emergency powers vested in the King also 
emerged.  
Subba put to me point-blank the question what would happen if the King’s powers to 
dispense with Cabinet Government were removed. I replied that in such a case the King 
would suspend the whole constitution, as had been done in Pakistan. That convinced him, 
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since he realised that a power to suspend the constitution must be included in the difficult 
conditions of Nepal. (I had at the previous meeting emphasised that Nepal lay between two 
very powerful neighbours). On the emergency power itself, I agreed to make separate 
provisions for war, etc., one the one hand and breakdown of constitutional machinery on the 
other, mentioning that this had been done in India. There was also objection to the power to 
remove difficulties. Since this was not important, I suggested the Indian provision, though I 
think in drafting it, I will give it more teeth.46  
By 15 April Jennings had prepared the second constitutional draft; he deemed it satisfactory:  
It will provide adequate means for direct rule if democratic government breaks down (or 
becomes corrupt, though I did not mention that), and on the other hand it would not enable 
the King to play fast and loose with democracy.47  
On 19 April, the Commission met without him and, on 20 April, Jennings completed the third 
draft. On 21 April, Jennings met again with the Commission and the drafting of an 
Explanatory Memorandum was agreed, which Jennings prepared that day.  
When I asked whether it should be in my own name or theirs, they preferred the former 
because it would be in the name of an “expert”, though I expect they thought it better for me 
to take responsibility if opposition developed.48  
On 23 April, Jennings held the sixth and final meeting with the Commission to finalise the 
draft and the Memorandum; he then left Kathmandu the following day. 
The meetings of the Commission in which Jennings took part were characterised by a 
circumspect attitude of the Members for fear of leakages and by complex negotiations 
between competing agendas. As a result, many exchanges between Jennings and Commission 
Members took place behind the curtains as private and unofficial one-to-one meetings, 
revealing the importance of brokering deals through backdoor negotiations, notwithstanding 
the fact that Jennings effectively led the deliberations of the Commission. Writing in June 
1958, the British Ambassador to Nepal reported the difficulties encountered by the 
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Commission after Jennings’ departure, especially with the translation of the draft from 
English into Nepali, and the preoccupation that amendments to the draft could still be made.49  
The draft Constitution was first approved by the coalition Cabinet and then submitted to King 
Mahendra for promulgation. Since Jennings’ departure from Kathmandu in late April 1958, it 
took over eight months for the King to promulgate the new Constitution.50 King Mahendra, 
however, chose to do so only one week before the scheduled general elections, on 12 
February 1959, leaving the political parties contesting the elections in the dark about the 
powers and functions of the government they were hoping to form: 
It is unclear whether this was an example of their political naïveté, or whether the provisions 
of the Constitution, as drafted by the Commission, were revised in the Royal Palace without 
the knowledge of the parties that had been represented in the Commission. In any case, by 
the time the Constitution was promulgated, it as too late for the parties to do anything about 
it. Several parties, and notably the Communist party, criticised the new Constitution for its 
feudal character, but, like the others, they continued to contest the election in a spirit of 
political resignation.51 
A perusal of Jennings’ third draft reveals that substantive additions were made to the text, 
most likely by the King and his entourage, especially with regard to the ethnocultural 
elements of the document, after his departure from Kathmandu.52 In particular, the clauses 
pertaining to the Shah monarchy were expanded to include extensive cultural, religious, and 
historical references supporting the King. A constitutional ban on conversion was inserted 
under Article 5, Freedom of Religion, for the first time in Nepali constitutional history. 
However, the framework devised by Jennings in his drafts regarding the efficient part of the 
Constitution with a central role of the Crown was preserved intact in the promulgated version 
of the dispensation. 
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4. The 1959 Constitution and Jennings’ Legacy in Nepal 
The 1959 Constitution has been a landmark document in Nepal’s constitutional history for 
two reasons: first, from a substantive point of view, it entrenched the dominance of an 
unaccountable executive under a nominally democratic framework. Second, from a symbolic 
point of view, it gave prominence to the historical ethnocultural nationalist narratives 
legitimising the wide powers of the King: the historical dynastic continuity of the Shah 
monarchy as the symbol of the unity of the nation, Hinduism, and the Nepali language. A 
perusal of Jennings’ three constitutional drafts in the archival material demonstrates that no 
ethnocultural references were included in the constitutional text during his visit.53 Therefore, 
it is logical to infer that the Nepali Drafting Commission, possibly under more or less direct 
instructions from King Mahendra, inserted that constellation of ‘symbolic’ provisions into the 
final document after Jennings’ departure. However, Jennings was implicated with the 
symbolic dimension of the new Constitution. It was the substantive institutional choices of a 
constitutional framework tilted in favour the monarchy that allowed for the symbolic 
ethnocultural elements to find a place in the constitutional text, even if at a later stage. 
In his Confidential Notes to the FCO, Jennings explained the reasons for the centrality of the 
Shah monarchy in the design of Nepal’s 1959 Constitution. He commented that the meaning 
of drafting a ‘democratic constitution’ in Nepal was to prepare a document ‘designed to vest 
power in a middle class, usually English-speaking oligarchy which was to pay attention to the 
needs of the hoi polloi because they have the vote […] but the difficulty in Nepal was to find 
the oligarchy’.54 Thus, in light of the Cold War context, Jennings was instructed to devise a 
constitutional framework capable of delivering political stability in the strategically located 
Himalayan Kingdom. As a result, the design of Nepal’s new constitution was based on 
Jennings’ reading of the country’s political situation, and he identified the Shah monarchy as 
the only stable political element and institution in Nepal. He, however, noted three main 
problems in this respect: first, King Mahendra was popular, but ‘obstinate and lacking 
character’ – and he was devoid of a court party he could rely on. Second, there was an 
unofficial Indian influence against the monarchy, mostly channelled through the Nepali 
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Congress, whose politicians he unceremoniously described as ‘lesser [Indian] Congress 
wallahs’. Third, Jennings felt that it was crucial to separate the person of the King from the 
institution of the Crown: ‘one must not presume too much of the King’s personal popularity 
and make him too obviously responsible for the efficiency of government. Whatever 
happens, the Government is going to be pretty inefficient and (I suspect) corrupt’.55  
Jennings saw no correspondents in Nepal for parties like the Indian Congress or the Pakistan 
Muslim League, or charismatic personalities like in Sri Lanka with D.S. Senenayake. As a 
result, Jennings contemplated the idea of instigating the formation of a political party around 
the authority of the King, composed of feudal local leaders, but then discarded it. He 
concluded that there existed ‘a number of Kathmandu groups miscalled “parties”, rather like 
the present situation in Pakistan’. However, Jennings opted not to devise a constitutional 
machinery designed for groups ‘for no such machine would function properly unless there 
was a strong public service […] so I have tried to strengthen the ties between the public 
service and the Crown, but the former seems to me to be excessively weak and indolent’, and 
instead designed a Constitution based on the prominence of the Crown.56 As a result, the 
Preamble of the 1959 Constitution ended up vesting state sovereignty solely in the King:  
‘I, King Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva in the exercise of the sovereign powers of the 
Kingdom of Nepal and prerogatives vesting in US in accordance with the traditions and 
customs of our country and which devolved on US from Our August and Respected 
forefathers, do hereby enact and promulgate this fundamental law entitled The Constitution 
of the Kingdom of Nepal’.57  
Moreover, for the first time in Nepali constitutional history, the centrality of the monarchy 
within the constitutional edifice was legitimised in ethnocultural nationalist terms, as clearly 
stated in the Preamble, which was however inserted after Jennings’ departure:  
‘His late Majesty King Tribhuvan Bir Bikram Shah Dev, Father of the Nation and revered 
descendant of the illustrious King Prithvi Narayan Shah, adherent of Aryan Culture and 
                                                          
55
 ICS 125/B/xiii/5/ii. 
56
 ICS 125/B/xiii/5/ii. 
57
 See: < http://www.ccd.org.np/resources/1959%20Constitution%20English.pdf>.  
19 
Hindu religion, having led a Great revolution for the rights and welfare of His subject, 
earned immortal fame in the history of the world and was firmly resolved to establish real 
democracy in Nepal by giving fundamental rights to the people’.58 
Jennings sought to devise a constitutional system in which the King had extensive powers 
without jeopardising the position of the Crown. Therefore, he sought to enshrine in the 
document a sort of Privy Council (Council of State) to insulate the institution of the 
monarchy from the unpopularity of an individual King under Article 11.  
The 1959 Constitution only nominally institutionalised the regime change of 1951 and the 
process of democratisation that was expected to follow suit. Instead, it established a 
framework completely tilted in favour of the ‘hereditary executive’ element of government 
(the monarchy) with very limited scope for the ‘representative executive’ (the Cabinet arising 
from, and responsible to, a directly elected Parliament). Modern constitutions have 
historically emerged as restrictions on arbitrary power featuring mechanisms to ensure 
limited government (e.g. in Britain to limit the powers of the monarch). In Nepal, however, 
the democratic representative element of government was entirely thwarted already at the 
stage of constitution drafting by allowing the unelected element of government to legally 
prevail over the elected one. Nepal’s 1959 Constitution exemplifies an instance of what 
Okoth-Ogendo has described as ‘constitutions without constitutionalism’.59  
Nepal’s new document did not institutionalise the transition from sovereignty from above to 
sovereignty from below in the country, as clearly illustrated in the Preamble, in which ‘the 
people’ were still paternalistically treated as ‘subjects’ rather than rights-bearing ‘citizens’:  
‘We also being firmly resolved to help our subjects to attain all round progress and achieve 
the fullest development of their personality; to ensure to them political, social and economic 
justice; and cement the unity of the nation by bringing about political stability through the 
establishment of an efficient monarchical form of government responsive to the wishes of 
the people’.  
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It is also important to note that there is no mention of democracy as a goal of the new 
Constitution either in the Preamble or in any part of the document. The prominence of 
‘hereditary executive’ over the ‘representative executive’ is well illustrated in a number of 
constitutional provisions. 
First, Article 10 defines Executive Power and vests it exclusively in the King, not in the 
Cabinet:  
The executive power of the Kingdom of Nepal is vested in His Majesty, extends to the 
execution and maintenance of this Constitution and the laws of Nepal, and shall be exercised 
by Him either directly or through Ministers or other officers subordinate to Him, in 
accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and of any other law for the time being 
in force.  
Second, the British convention by which the King shall act on the advice and 
recommendation of the Prime Minister was completely diluted and distorted by the 
combination of Article 10(2):  
Where under this Constitution His Majesty is not specifically empowered to act in His 
discretion or on the recommendation of a specified person, He shall act on the 
recommendation of the Cabinet conveyed by the Prime Minister or on the recommendation 
of the Minister of the Crown authorised by the Prime Minister to deal with the matter in 
question’. 
With Article 10(3)  
‘Except on the ground of urgency, no recommendation in any matter specified by His 
Majesty shall be made to His Majesty until His Majesty has been informally consulted, and 
His Majesty may refer any recommendation for consideration by the Cabinet, whether or not 
it has already been considered by the Cabinet’. 
And Article 10(5) of the 1959 document  
‘If any question arises whether any matter is or is not a matter in respect of which His 
Majesty in His discretion shall be final, and the validity of anything done by His Majesty 
shall not be called in question of the ground that He ought or ought not to have acted in His 
discretion’.  
Third, Article 13(1) undermined the British convention regulating the monarch’s prerogative 
power of appointing as Prime Minister the leader of the political party commanding the 
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majority in Parliament’s Lower House. An element of royal discretion was injected in the 
provision by adding the words ‘in the opinion of His Majesty’:  
‘The Prime Minister shall be appointed by His Majesty, acting in His discretion and shall be 
a person who will be able in the opinion of His Majesty, to command a majority in the 
House of Representatives, either immediately or at the meeting of Parliament after the next 
general election’.  
In fact, Article 13(3) included the following clause:  
‘Provided that if His Majesty in His discretion is satisfied that no such person will be able to 
command a majority in that House in accordance with clause (1), He may appoint as Prime 
Minister a person who is not a member of that House, but no person shall hold office as 
Prime Minister for more than four months unless he is a Senator or a member of the House 
of Representatives’.  
In this respect, it is interesting to look at the formulation of Cabinet’s collective responsibility 
in Jennings’ third draft where the role of the monarch in Nepal is wider than in Westminster: 
‘The Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the King and the Parliament’.60  
Fourth, the long-standing British convention by which the monarch shall not withhold Royal 
Assent to a Bill passed by Parliament was overtly subverted in Article 42, which explicitly 
provided for the King to be able to withhold Royal Assent at his discretion. As commentators 
highlighted, if a Prime Minister was independent-minded, then Cabinet Government was 
destined to fail under such a constitutional framework.61 
Lastly, Jennings was aware of the precarious position of Cabinet Government under the new 
dispensation, thus he devised a series of mechanisms to preserve a cloak of legality in 
emergency circumstances. He concluded that his draft constitution was indeed a compromise 
featuring Cabinet Government as long as practicable. Ample powers were given to the King 
to suspend Cabinet Government under Article 55 based on the so-called ‘Pakistan formula’ or 
even the Constitution under Article 56, and assume direct powers under Article 77, the power 
to remove difficulties. Ultimately, this scheme was backed by the fact that the Constitution 
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gave the King exclusive control over the Royal Nepal Army under Article 64 and did not 
bring the armed forces under parliamentary control. Jennings also argued that a Chapter on 
Fundamental Rights – based on the Indian model, which he disliked62 – was forced upon him 
by the Commission, but that it would have been easy for the King (but not for the politicians) 
to suspend them if they proved too restrictive. Jennings commented about the scheme in the 
following terms:  
The King can always appeal to the people and prove to the politicians whether or not they 
have popular support; and if the electorate does not produce a stable government, the fault 
will lie with the politicians. The Commission took to this scheme quite well and I had not to 
compromise it much.63  
The last statement about the alleged acquiescence of the Nepali Drafting Commission to 
Jennings’ designs points towards two considerations. First of all, the Commission was 
heavily influenced by the will and vision of King Mahendra. The representation of various 
political forces within the Commission was skewed and unequal, featuring a clear majority of 
royalist members. In direct connection to this, the King had specifically selected Jennings to 
provide an institutional solution to his political vision for Nepal, and legitimise it through the 
authority of the foreign expert. In this sense, Jennings’ advisory work and the FO agenda 
ended up being mediated and moulded by the agency of local Nepali actors. 
 
5. Conclusions 
To conclude, when Jennings returned to the UK, he sent a report dated 27 April 1958 to the 
FO, in which he stated that he felt reasonably satisfied that the draft would ‘work’, even if he 
could not guaranteed he had properly seized the local situation.64 It remains unclear what 
were Jennings’ parameters in assessing the success of his constitutional work in Nepal. In 
fact, in December 1960 King Mahendra carried out a ‘royal coup’ by suspending the 1959 
Constitution and sacking the B.P. Koirala Nepali Congress Government, a little over a year 
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after Nepal’s first general elections. Jennings readily admitted that the 1959 Nepali document 
granted unusually wide powers to the King and knew that it would have been criticised as 
‘undemocratic’. But he justified it as a necessary measure to prevent the complete breakdown 
of the governmental machinery in Nepal. 65  King Mahendra ushered in the so-called 
‘Panchayat regime’, a form of neo-traditionalist autocratic system centred on the Shah King, 
who was heavily implicated in all the branches of government. Thus, the 1959 Constitution 
can be interpreted as the progenitor of the 1962 Panchayat Constitution in light of the 
substantive and symbolic centrality accorded to the monarchy in both dispensations. Thus, if 
the contiguity between the two Constitutions is accepted, it can be argued that they saw 
Nepal through the Cold War. From this perspective, then perhaps Sir Ivor Jennings did help 
Nepal secure political stability, but certainly at the expenses of constitutional democracy. 
In this respect, the long-term impact of Jennings’ advisory work on constitutional democracy 
in Nepal merits further attention. Jennings’ outright subversion of key Westminster principles 
exposed the frailty of constitutional conventions and the difficulty of transposing them from 
one context to another. In this respect, the Hobbesian understanding of governmental 
authority that Jennings implanted in Nepal through non-existent checks on the executive, 
especially in its ‘hereditary’ manifestation, and draconian emergency powers took root in 
Nepal’s constitutional culture. Signs of Jennings’ legacy are indeed visible even in the text of 
the 1990 Constitution and its implementation. On the one hand, tensions between the elected 
government and the King remained a constant feature of the 1990 constitutional experience. 
On the other hand, the symbolic centrality accorded to the monarchy and its legitimising 
ethnocultural nationalist features in the 1990 Constitution further reinforced the hegemony of 
the dominant upper-caste Pahari groups and their hold on state power. Somehow Nepal has 
been unable to this day to constitutionalise the executive branch of government – that seems 
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